

Questions for **T. Williamson, Unanalyzable Knowledge**

1. What reasons are given for the claim that knowledge, and not perception, are the reverse counterpart of action in terms of output from mind to world?
2. In what consists the “orthodox” epistemological claim that belief is conceptually prior to knowledge? What is the connection between that claim and Gettier’s results?
3. What is the argument to the conceptual priority of belief from the premise that knowledge entails belief?
4. In what consists the circularity reply given to that argument?
5. In what sense can the inference from knowledge to belief be explained by the reverse claim of the conceptual priority of knowledge over belief?
6. What is Williamson’s view about such explanation?
7. What is the problem with those attempts to analyze knowledge in terms of true justified belief that employ a stronger notion of justification?
8. What is the second argument for the conceptual priority of belief over knowledge (in terms of the notion of approximation)?
9. What is the reply given by Williamson to that argument?
10. What sort of destructive dilemma any analysis of knowledge faces? What are the morals drawn from it by Williamson?